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smaller actions necessarily means devot-
ing less space to the critically important 
ones. Coverage is always a delicate matter, 
for while leaving something out invites 
criticism that the book is incomplete, 
limiting coverage of the critical turning 
points invites criticism of another kind.
Mawdsley has chosen to be inclusive, 
and he covers a number of events that 
are overlooked in most general histories 
(including my own), such as the British 
raid on the Lofoten Islands off Norway 
(Operation CLAYMORE) in 1941 and 
the invasion of Madagascar (Operation 
IRONCLAD) in 1942, as well as extensive 
coverage of the Soviet navy in both the 
Baltic and Black Seas. All that comes 
with a cost, of course; running to six 
hundred pages, Mawdsley’s book is 
not short, and yet it occasionally feels 
crowded as events pile up on one 
another—although no doubt that is how 
the war felt to those who fought it as well.
Mawdsley is not afraid to make judg-
ments. He argues, for example, that the 
role of “special intelligence” (ULTRA) 
has been greatly exaggerated and 
that Hitler gave up on the invasion of 
England (Operation SEA LION) before the 
Battle of Britain even began. He defends 
Churchill’s decision to attack the French 
fleet at Mers el-Kébir, asserting that it 
was “correct” (p. 71), and concedes that 
the Dieppe raid was “badly planned,” 
for which Mountbatten “deserves 
some blame” (p. 282). In the Pacific, 
Mawdsley concludes that Kimmel and 
Short were “rightly held responsible” 
for being unready on 7 December 
1941 (p. 182) and that Nagumo was 
“surely right” not to approve a third aerial 
attack against Pearl Harbor (p. 181).
It would be inappropriate for me to 
recommend one of these books over 
the other. Therefore I merely will 
suggest here that those interested 
in the naval war from 1939 to 1945 
should read (and buy) both of them.
CRAIG L. SYMONDS
Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer 
for Senior Leaders, by Thomas P. Galvin. Carlisle, 
PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018. 120 
pages. Available for download at publications 
.armywarcollege.edu/. Free.
As Charles D. Allen states in the fore-
word, “70 to 80 percent of organizational 
change efforts fail” (p. vii). Numerous 
reasons exist why initiatives to improve 
an organization’s performance, effective-
ness, or morale do not succeed: incorrect 
problem diagnosis, poor planning or 
resourcing, strategy mismatch to culture, 
and resistance, among others. U.S. 
Army War College professor Thomas 
P. Galvin’s well-researched primer 
effectively distills numerous organiza-
tional change philosophies and strategies 
into a practical and intuitive guidebook 
for military professionals at all levels.
A plethora of books on organizational 
change exists, with an Amazon.com 
search returning hundreds of results. 
Professor Galvin tailors his approach to 
the unique challenges of the military, 
which prepares for an uncertain future 
environment that before the crucible 
of operations and combat can only be 
simulated. He argues that most change 
efforts are too process oriented, at the 
expense of the often-overlooked context 
of the environment and the content 
of the change effort, which explain 
its purpose and the path to success. 
To this end, he develops a framework 
similar to the military’s planning process 
that emphasizes context and content, 
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with sequences of questions to aid in 
navigating all stages of change efforts.
Galvin argues that understanding the 
context requires correctly diagnosing 
the problem, gauging receptivity to 
the proposed change, and determining 
whether it even warrants expending 
the resources. Although hierarchical, 
military organizations are complex 
adaptive systems, highlighting the 
difficulty in tracing causal links and 
often resulting in misdiagnosis. Factors 
that gauge receptivity to the change 
include internal and external environ-
mental pressures; the level of trust and 
empowerment within the organization; 
and, for distributed organizations, the 
fit between the change agenda and 
local contexts. We live in an age of data 
analytics, and often suffer from survey 
fatigue. Therefore, taking the time to de-
termine what data to collect for analysis 
is essential and may flush out funda-
mental issues that need to be addressed 
before implementation can proceed.
The most valuable section deals with 
forecasting, which is the glue of the 
content portion of the book. This links 
the vision, plan, and communication 
effort. While still an endeavor of 
uncertainty, forecasting is differenti-
ated from prediction in that it is more 
quantifiable and probabilistic. Although 
many tools exist within the Department 
of Defense to paint this picture, making 
a convincing case remains a challenge 
from the strategic to the tactical level. 
As General Martin Dempsey said in 
an interview with Kelly Brownell for 
the 9 September 2016 Making It Matter 
podcast concerning the significant cuts 
imposed by the 2011 Budget Control 
Act, “When people ask me if I have 
any regrets during my four years as 
Chairman, one of them in particular is 
I really never managed to convince the 
Congress of the United States that what 
they were doing to the military budget 
would have a detrimental effect over 
time. . . . It’s hard to articulate words 
like risk, they can be parsed and they 
can be twisted or turned, or words like 
readiness.” His salient point highlights 
the difficulties leaders have in articulat-
ing future risk and promoting change.
Professor Galvin recommends 
constructing dual narratives of future 
undesired and desired end states, with 
the former describing a status quo that 
risks mission failure and the latter a 
version in which competitive advantage 
is restored. His principles of prepared-
ness consist of a series of questions to 
spark development of these competing 
stories and include tangible and 
abstract performance metrics. While 
vivid imagery, framing, and marketing 
can help sell an idea, Galvin correctly 
asserts that credibility demands rigor. 
Narratives must limit negations, refrain 
from sounding unduly alarmist, and 
avoid one’s being perceived as simply 
a cheerleader. Once all elements are 
established, the concept should be 
expressed as a cognitive journey in 
practical and actionable terms, with 
obstacles and barriers presented as chal-
lenges that can and must be overcome.
Galvin’s primer is filled with invaluable 
insights, frameworks, and anecdotes. 
He provides examples of failed changes, 
including General Eric K. Shinseki’s 
decision to switch from standard 
headgear to the black beret and Secre-
tary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s 
attempt to transition to the National 
Security Personnel System. However, 
selection of a case study, vignette, or 
scenario applicable to any number of 
situations and woven throughout the 
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entire primer or as a separate annex 
might have stitched the elements of 
the book tighter together and made it 
resonate more. Regardless, leaders at 
all levels who want to increase their 
chances of successfully implementing 
and sustaining an organizational change 
effort will benefit from making this an 
essential addition to their tool kit.
KENNETH M. SANDLER
The Marine Corps Way of War: The Evolution of 
the U.S. Marine Corps from Attrition to Maneuver 
Warfare in the Post-Vietnam Era, by Anthony J. 
Piscitelli. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2017. 
264 pages. $27.50.
Despite battlefield success in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan over the past fifteen 
years, the threat environment confront-
ing the United States and its Marine 
Corps only has grown more dangerous. 
The United States now confronts a 
variety of challenges both old and new, 
including the return of great-power 
conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and Europe; 
operating in (what until recently has 
been called) an antiaccess/area-denial 
(A2/AD) battle space; nuclear prolifera-
tion; and navigating the effects of global 
climate change on military operations. 
Such an environment calls for both refin-
ing old solutions and thinking in new, 
bold ways to ensure that the U.S. mili-
tary—and especially, for purposes of this 
review, the Marine Corps—is ready to 
meet, fight, and defeat any future threats.
Author Anthony Piscitelli leverages his 
years of State Department and academic 
experience to map the evolution of the 
Marine Corps’s approach to war in 
the post–Vietnam War era, all the 
while highlighting the personalities 
involved in that process. Piscitelli’s 
work ultimately is most useful, though, 
not for reviewing why the Marine 
Corps adopted maneuver warfare but 
for providing a model for instituting 
structural changes at the service level 
necessary for future battlefield success.
Following the Vietnam War, a combina-
tion of external and internal pressures led 
the Marine Corps to institutionalize and 
train to a war-fighting philosophy it had 
practiced to varying degrees throughout 
its history. The Marine Corps Way of 
War details how the Marine Corps had 
practiced elements of maneuver warfare 
from Belleau Wood to Beirut. This 
historical survey provides the context 
for the interpersonal and bureaucratic 
battles that Piscitelli then recounts that 
led to the Corps’s full embrace of ma-
neuver warfare in the post-Vietnam era.
Piscitelli then uses an excellent combina-
tion of first-person interviews and 
after-action reports to summarize how 
the Corps’s success in all the humanitar-
ian operations, low-intensity conflicts, 
and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after 
Vietnam resulted from the major internal 
and external bureaucratic struggles over 
the service’s future during that era. The 
book’s emphasis on education and the 
impact of maneuver warfare on Marines’ 
professional development also deserves 
mention. Piscitelli’s decision to explore 
how the adoption of maneuver warfare 
also forced the Corps to rethink the 
professional development of its enlisted 
and officer populations underscores 
how the human element of war remains 
the most important variable in any 
conflict. One should be forgiven for 
thinking that parts of the book serve as 
justification for MCDP-1, Warfighting.
Yet, despite providing an excellent 
analysis that explores how the Corps 
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